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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 06-5188
_____________
CLARENCE DAVIS,
Appellant
v.
PENNSYLVANIA STATE; PA DEPT OF CORRECTIONS;
SUPERINTENDENT JEFFREY A. BEARD;
THOMAS JAMES, Hearing Officer;
SUPERINTENDENT BEN VARNER;
DEPUTY WARDEN THOMAS LAVAN;
DEPUTY THOMAS STACHELEK;
GRIEVANCE COORDINATOR KENNETH BURNETT;
NORM DEMMING, Program Manager;
UNIT MANAGER WAYNE COLE; CAPTAIN GRIEGO;
C.O. CHESTER D. FILIPIAK; MAJOR JONES;
THOMAS YACKIEL, Unit Team Manager; MAJOR KOMSISKY
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 03-cv-00068 )
District Judge: Honorable William J. Nealon
_______________________________________

Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action
Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
July 19, 2007
Before: SLOVITER, CHAGARES AND GREENBERG, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed: July 26, 2007)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________

PER CURIAM
Clarence Davis appeals from the order of the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania denying his motion for summary judgment and granting
Appellee Chester Filipak’s motion for summary judgment. We conclude that the District
Court properly granted summary judgment. Because this appeal presents no substantial
question, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order. See Third Circuit LAR
27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.
Davis, an inmate currently incarcerated at Pennsylvania SCI-Retreat, filed a
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his constitutional rights were
violated while incarcerated at Pennsylvania SCI-Dallas. After reviewing the complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the District Court dismissed all Defendants save one. Only
Davis’s claim for retaliation against Defendant Filipak ( “Filipak”) was permitted to
proceed. Davis asserts that after filing a grievance with prison officials about Filipak,
who allegedly threatened him, Filipak retaliated by filing a report against Davis. Davis
asserts that Filipak filed a report stating that their children, who attend school together,
got into an altercation;1 however, Davis alleges that Filipak’s motivation for filing the
report was solely to have Davis moved to the restrictive housing unit in retaliation for
Davis’s earlier grievance. After conducting discovery, Davis and Filipak filed separate
motions for summary judgment. The District Court denied Davis’s motion and granted

1

It is undisputed that Davis’s child and Filipak’s child had an altercation at school.
2

Filipak’s motion for summary judgment. Davis appeals.2
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the District
Court’s order granting summary judgment is plenary. Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for the
Town of Morristown, 958 F.2d 1242, 1250 (3d Cir. 1992). Summary judgment may be
granted only where “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We will
summarily affirm a district court’s order if an appeal presents no substantial question.
See I.O.P. 10.6.
In a claim for retaliation, an inmate must prove that the conduct which led to the
alleged retaliation was constitutionally protected. Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d
Cir. 2001). Next, the inmate must demonstrate that he suffered some adverse action from
prison officials. Id. Once these two threshold requirements are met, the inmate must then
prove a causal link between the exercise of his constitutional rights and the adverse action
taken against him. Id. A causal link is proven by demonstrating that the “constitutionally
protected conduct was a ‘substantial or motivating factor’ in the decision to discipline
him.” Id. (quoting Mount Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).
“[O]nce a prisoner demonstrates that his exercise of a constitutional right was a
substantial or motivating factor in the challenged decision, the prison officials may still
prevail by proving that they would have made the same decision absent the protected
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Davis’s notice of appeal seeks to appeal only from the District Court’s order granting
summary judgment in favor of Filipak. Accordingly, our review is limited to that issue.
3

conduct for reasons reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.” Id. at 334.
The District Court determined that Davis had a constitutional right to file a
grievance against Filipak, and that his placement into administrative custody and his
transfer to another facility were sufficient to constitute adverse action. However, the
District Court determined that Davis had failed to show a causal link between his
constitutionally protected conduct and the adverse action. The District Court also held
that Filipak had proven that Davis’s placement into administrative custody and his
transfer to another facility were reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.
We agree. The declarations of Michael Griego and Robert Komsisky provide that, after
Filipak made the initial report informing his supervisor about the children’s altercation,
he had no further influence in the decision making process. (Def.’s Supp. App. to Mot. for
Summ. J.). Griego’s declaration states that he, not Filipak, approved the transfer of Davis
to administrative custody pending review of the program review committee to eliminate
the appearance of a conflict of interest between Filipak and Davis. Id. at 2. Furthermore,
Griego’s declaration states that when a conflict of interest arises between an inmate and a
staff member, the safety and stability of the institution requires that those individuals be
separated. Id.
Because Filipak did not make the decision to place Davis into administrative
custody or transfer him to another facility and because the decision to place Davis in
administrative custody and to transfer him to another facility was reasonably related to a
legitimate penological interest, namely the security of the facility, the District Court
4

properly granted Filipak’s motion for summary judgment. Because this appeal presents
no substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order. See Third
Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.
Davis’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied.
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